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Case No. 20080810-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellant, 
vs. 
FRANK AUGUST MARRONE, 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State appeals from a final order of dismissal, which followed an order 
granting Defendant's motion to suppress. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(d) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Issue. Was Defendant's voluntary consent to search his rented vehicle, 
given after the detention ended, obtained by police exploitation of prior 
illegality? 
Standard of Review. The court's factual findings are reviewed for clear 
error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, | 11,100 P.3d 1222. The court's legal 
conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including its 
application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,111,103 
P.3d 699. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Preservation. Defendant raised this issue below in a motion to suppress, 
which was opposed by the State. R. 39-40, 46-54, 67-70. After holding an 
evidentiary hearing and taking argument on the matter, the district court 
granted the motion to suppress in a memorandum decision. See 73-84, 93. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For conduct occurring on 8 November 2007, Defendant was charged by 
Information with (1) possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a second 
degree felony, (2) possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, and 
(3) speeding, a class C misdemeanor. R. 1-3. Following a preliminary hearing, a 
magistrate bound Defendant over to stand trial. R. 35-36; R. 93:1-31. Defendant 
thereafter moved to suppress the evidence seized during the traffic stop. R. 39-
40, 46-54. After taking evidence and considering the parties' written and oral 
arguments, the trial court granted the motion to suppress in a written 
memorandum decision. R. 73-84 (Addendum B). The case was thereafter 
dismissed on the State's motion and the State timely appealed. R. 85-89. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time of the stop at issue in this case, Trooper Michael Bradford had 
been with the Utah Highway Patrol (UHP) for three years; he served in the San 
Juan County Sheriffs Office during the previous ten years. R. 93:2,55. He was a 
member of UHP's Criminal Interdiction Team, which actively works Utah's 
federal highways to identify and apprehend those involved in criminal activity, 
including drug traffickers. R. 93: 2, 35-36, 45, 69-70. In addition to his POST 
training, Bradford completed all four phases of the Desert Snow program, which 
provides specialized training in highway interdiction techniques and methods. 
See R. 93: 36,47-48,21. He also received specialized interdiction training from 
Sergeant Steve Salas, one of Utah's top interdiction troopers, and worked nine 
months on 1-70. R. 93: 48. In his three years of interdiction service, Bradford 
had more than 300 drug seizures, seventeen or eighteen of which involved large 
quantities of trafficked drugs. R. 93: 50-52. 
* * * 
On November 8, 2008, Bradford and several other troopers on the 
Criminal Interdiction Team were working 1-80 in Summit County. R. 93: 35. 
While monitoring eastbound traffic from his parked patrol car, Bradford clocked 
Defendant driving an SUV at 85 m.p.h. — 20 m.p.h. over the posted speed limit. 
R. 93: 36-37, 52 (R.74:^|l-2). Bradford stopped Defendant at milepost 148. R. 
93:36-37 (R.74:^|l). Defendant immediately acknowledged that he was speeding 
-3-
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and apologized. R. 93: 38, 57 ((R.74:^[2). Bradford advised Defendant of his 
speed and requested his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. R. 
93: 38,57-58 (R.74:^[2). Defendant provided the requested documentation and 
also a rental agreement for the vehicle. R. 93: 37, 58, 69 (R.74:^[2). 
While Defendant was retrieving the documentation, Bradford observed 
numerous items inside the vehicle suggesting to Bradford, based on his training 
and experience, that Defendant may be trafficking narcotics. R. 93:55-56,61-62. 
The SUV had a "lived in" look to it. R. 93:37,62 (R.74:^f3). A Camelback water 
hydration system was attached to the back of the driver's seat for easy access by 
the driver. R. 93: 5-6,37,62 (R.74:Tf3). Also in the vehicle were a lot of snacks, a 
large blue cooler, and a case of Red Bull energy drinks. R. 93: 37, 62 (R.74:^|3). 
These items were consistent with the behavior of drug traffickers who are trying 
to "get from Point A to Point B" within a specific timeframe, without the need of 
making any motel stops. R. 93: 38-39, 62, 65-66. Bradford also saw, tucked 
between the driver's seat and console, a package of incense sticks, which are 
frequently used by drug traffickers to mask the smell of drugs, but are seldom 
seen in rental vehicles. R. 93:6,37-38,62 (R.74:1J3). The rental status of the SUV 
also added to Bradford's suspicion because drug couriers frequently use rental 
cars to avoid forfeiture of personal vehicles. R. 93: 38, 69. 
-4-
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Sometime during this initial encounter, Bradford asked Defendant where 
he was coming from and where he was going. R. 93: 39, 58-61, 83-84 (R.74-
75:^4). Defendant said he had flown to California from Florida to help his 
mother during the California brush fires and was now returning to Florida. R. 
93:39 (R.75:^|4). However, he was unable to provide Bradford with his mother's 
address, which raised the trooper's suspicion. R. 93:39. After handing Bradford 
the vehicle documentation, Defendant joined Bradford in his patrol car while 
Bradford gathered additional information needed to complete the citation. R. 
93: 71, 77-78 (R.75: W - 5 ) . Upon entering the car, Bradford radioed for backup 
and ran Defendant's information through dispatch. R. 93: 71, 78 (R.76-77:^[8). 
"[W]hile [Defendant's] information [was] being run" through dispatch, 
Bradford asked Defendant for other information necessary to complete the 
citation "and then [he] also asked him about his travels." R. 93: 78-79.1 
Defendant explained that his mother had driven him to Reno, Nevada, where he 
then rented the SUV. R. 93:64,79 (R.75:f6). Bradford asked Defendant why he 
was driving back to Florida, rather than flying. R. 93:39. Defendant explained 
that "he was actually going to stop in Wyoming because he had a hunt he was 
going on" with friends from North Carolina. R. 93:39-40,64,78-79 (R.75-76:1J6). 
Knowing that hunting season was over in Wyoming, Bradford asked Defendant 
1
 The court found that "the timing [of this questioning] was not clarified 
by the State." R.75:]f5. The State challenges that finding, infra, at 19. 
-5-
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more about the hunting trip. R. 93:39,64 (R.75:^f5). Defendant, however, could 
"not tell [Bradford] anything about this hunt in Wyoming/' R. 93: 64. He did 
not know "what type of hunt he was going on, had no idea what he was going 
to hunt, and did not have a name [of] an outfitter/7 R. 93:39,64 (R.75:16). When 
asked whether he had a rifle or bow, Defendant said he had neither and asked 
whether the outfitters supplied the weapon. R. 93: 39 (R.76:]f6). 
While conversing with Defendant in the patrol car, dispatch radioed 
Bradford, advising him of Defendant's extensive criminal history for narcotics 
trafficking. R. 93:41,63 (R.76:^f7). Upon hearing this, Defendant volunteered to 
the trooper, "[Y]ou know, I have nothing to hide, you can search my vehicle if 
you'd like." R. 93:40,79-80 (R.76^7). Bradford ignored Defendant's offer and 
continued to write the citation. R. 93: 9. While Bradford was filling out the 
citation, Sergeant Steve Salas, who had a drug detection dog with him, and 
Lieutenant Chris Smith, arrived as backup, but they remained in their patrol 
cars. R. 93:12, 71-72 (R.77:18). 
After completing the citation, Bradford handed the ticket to Defendant, 
returned his license and vehicle documentation, and told him to "drive careful" 
and have a good day. R. 93:40,73,79 (R.76:]f8). Defendant exited the patrol car, 
closed the door behind him, and began walking back to the SUV. R. 93: 40, 73 
(R.76:]f8). Bradford then also exited his patrol car, walked up to Defendant, 
-6-
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meeting him between the two vehicles, and asked "if [he] could ask some 
additional questions/7 R. 93: 40, 73-74 (R.76:18). Defendant said, "Yeah, go 
ahead." R. 93: 40, 73-75 (R.76:^[8). Bradford asked Defendant whether he was 
trafficking "any cocaine, marijuana, [or] methamphetamine in the vehicle." R. 
93: 40, 75 (R.76:]|8). Defendant said he was not and again invited Bradford to 
"go ahead and look, bring a dog." R. 93: 41, 75 (R.76:^8). 
After obtaining Defendant's consent, Bradford searched the SUV and 
found two spare tires covered by a blanket in the SUV's cargo compartment. R. 
93: 9-11, 41-42, 72 (R.77:^9). When questioned about the tires, Defendant said 
they were going to be mounted on his camper in Florida. R. 93: 42 (R.77:^9). 
The tires, however, were different sizes, had different bolt configurations, and 
were in poor condition. R. 93: 42 (R.77:^|9). Bradford also noticed that a fresh 
sealant was dried onto the tires' sidewalls, suggesting that they had recently 
been mounted. R. 93: 42 (R.77:]f9). After an echo test confirmed that some 
substance other than air was inside the tires, Bradford opened them up and 
found 36 packages of high grade marijuana. R. 93: 43 (R.77:^[9). The troopers 
found 17 more packages of marijuana in a third tire, which was attached to the 
undercarriage of the vehicle. R. 93: 43 (R.77:]f9). In all, some 40 pounds of 
marijuana was seized. R. 93: 43-44. Sgt. Salas also ran the dog around the 
vehicle, but the dog did not alert on any other drugs. R. 93: 42,71 (R.77:^[9). 
-7-
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court correctly concluded that Defendant voluntarily 
consented to a search of his rented vehicle. However, it incorrectly concluded 
that the consent was obtained by police exploitation of prior illegality. Contrary 
to the conclusion of the district court, there was no prior illegality. After 
stopping Defendant for speeding, Trooper Bradford questioned Defendant 
about his travel plans. Those questions were justified because there was 
reasonable suspicion Defendant was trafficking drugs. 
Bradford observed incense sticks, which he testified are rarely seen in 
rental cars, but frequently used by drug traffickers. He also testified that drug 
couriers are often on a stringent timeline, requiring them to travel long distances 
without stopping. He saw indicia of such a purpose, including energy drinks 
and a Camelback hydration system. The urgency, and suspicious nature of this, 
was highlighted by the fact the hydration system was strapped to the driver's 
seat to permit ready access. In addition, Bradford knew that drug traffickers 
often used rental vehicles to avoid forfeiture of personal vehicles. These facts, 
viewed in their totality, supported a reasonable suspicion to justify the brief 
inquiry into Defendant's travels. In any case, the travel questions were 
reasonably related to the initial traffic stop. Moreover, the questions did not 
-8-
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measurably extend the duration of the stop, and thus did not render the 
encounter unlawful. 
Where the initial travel questions were permissible, so too were the 
follow-up questions in the patrol car. Indeed, the district court correctly 
concluded that Defendant's answers to the initial questions provided reasonable 
suspicion justifying continued detention and questioning. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the travel questions rendered the 
detention unlawful, Defendant's subsequent consent was not the product of that 
illegality. Although only a few seconds passed between the supposed illegality 
and the detention, the questioning was not flagrantly unlawful. Nor did it in 
any way contribute to Defendant's consent to search. And most significantly, 
when consent was given, the stop had de-escalated to a consensual encounter. 
Trooper Bradford handed Defendant the citation, returned his documentation, 
and told him to have a good day and drive safely. And consistent with that de-
escalation, Defendant exited the car and began walking back to his car. This 
intervening circumstance represented a clear break in any causal chain between 
the travel questions and Defendant's otherwise voluntary consent. Moreover, 
Defendant himself spontaneously invited the trooper to search his vehicle. 
Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the consent was the product of 
any unlawful questioning. 
-9-
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO SEARCH 
HIS VEHICLE WAS NOT OBTAINED BY POLICE 
EXPLOITATION OF PRIOR ILLEGALITY 
"[0]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of 
both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to 
consent." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,219 (1973). A consent search 
"is valid only if "(1) [t]he consent was given voluntarily, and (2) the consent was 
not obtained by police exploitation of prior illegality/^ State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 
125,147,63 P.3d 650 (citations omitted). In this case, the district court correctly 
concluded that Defendant's consent to search was voluntary. R.81:]f5. 
However, it incorrectly concluded that the consent was obtained by police 
exploitation of a prior illegality and suppressed the evidence. That decision 
should be reversed. 
* "k -k 
In determining whether a consent was "obtained by police exploitation of 
prior illegality," the Court must, as a threshold matter, determine whether there 
was, in fact, a "prior illegality." If the Court concludes there was no illegality, 
there can be no taint and the inquiry ends. See United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 
360, 384 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that "[i]n the absence of a primary illegality 
there can be no taint"), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985). If, on the other hand, 
the Court concludes there was a prior illegality, it must then determine whether 
-10-
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the consent was obtained by exploiting that illegality. Contrary to the district 
court's conclusion below, there was no prior illegality in this case. Even if there 
were, Trooper Bradford did not exploit that illegality to obtain consent. 
A. THE TRAFFIC STOP OF DEFENDANT AND RESULTING 
DETENTION WERE LAWFUL. 
Like the investigatory detention discussed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968), a traffic stop "must be 'justified at its inception, and . . . reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place/" Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177,185 (2004) 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20). "Once the purpose of the initial stop is 
concluded,... the person must be allowed to depart." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 
125, f 31, 63 P.3d 650. Any further detention is unlawful "unless [the] officer 
has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a further illegality." Id. 
1. The stop was justified at its inception. 
In this case, Trooper Bradford clocked Defendant traveling 85 m.p.h. in a 
65 m.p.h. zone. R. 93: 36-37, 52 (R.74:lll-2). The stop for speeding was, 
therefore, justified at its inception. See Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \ 30 (holding that a 
stop is justified at its inception when made in response to a traffic violation 
committed in the officer's presence). Defendant did not contend otherwise 
below. See R.49, R.77:f 1. Accordingly, the initial stop is not at issue on appeal. 
-11-
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2. The trooper's questions about Defendant's travels did not 
exceed the permissible scope or duration of the stop. 
At some point during his conversation with Defendant through the 
driver's side window of the SUV, Trooper Bradford asked Defendant "where 
[he] was coming from and where he was going." R.74-75:]f4. Defendant told 
him that "he had flown from Florida to California to help his mother with the 
California fires recently occurring there and was driving back to Florida" in the 
SUV he had rented in Reno, Nevada. R.75:^4; R.79:TJ4. Unsatisfied with the 
State's evidence regarding the timing of the travel questions, the district court 
found that they "necessarily delayed the traffic stop." R.78-79:^[3. The court 
then concluded that the travel questions converted the encounter into an 
unlawful detention because the facts and circumstances confronting the trooper 
at the time did "not amount to reasonable suspicion" of drug trafficking, 
"warranting] further detention and further questions." R.79:f3; R.81-82:^8-9. 
The district court's ruling is incorrect. 
* * * 
As in any Terry stop, officers making a traffic stop are required to 
"diligently pursue[ ] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel 
their suspicions quickly." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). For 
example, officers "'may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, 
conduct a computer check, and issue a citation.'" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 
-12-
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1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431,435 (Utah App. 1990)); 
see also State v. Brokmeyer, 2000 UT App 303U (recognizing that officers may 
request proof of insurance). They also may run a warrants check, "so long as it 
does not significantly extend the period of detention beyond that reasonably 
necessary to [complete the stop]/' Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133. And as "an essential 
part of [any] police investigation! ]," Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185, officers may pose 
reasonable questions designed to confirm or dispel the suspicion giving rise to 
the stop. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993). 
To satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, an officer must be able to 
point to "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts," support a reasonable belief that "criminal activity 
may be afoot." Terry, 392 U.S at 21, 30. "Although an officer's reliance on a 
mere 'hunch' is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity 
need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably 
short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard." United States v. 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,274 (2002) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at27). Accordingly, "[a] 
determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the 
possibility of innocent conduct." Id. at 277,122 S.Ct. at 753. 
When assessing reasonable suspicion, reviewing courts "must look at the 
'totality of the circumstances' of each case to see whether the detaining officer 
-13-
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ha[d] a 'particularized and objective basis' for suspecting legal wrongdoing." Id. 
at 273 (citations omitted). Courts should "'judge the officer's conduct in light of 
common sense and ordinary human experience." State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 
160, f 8,47 P.3d 932 (quoting United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262,1268 (10th 
Cir. 2001)). Courts must also give "due weight" to an officer's assessment of 
"the cumulative facts," which might well elude a person without the officer's 
experience and specialized training. State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, W 20,14, 78 
P.3d 590. Finally, courts must be careful to assess the suspicion in light of the 
whole picture,"avoid [ing] the temptation to divide the facts and evaluate them 
in isolation from each other." Id. at \ 14. 
The facts and circumstances confronting Trooper Bradford at the time 
were sufficient to support a reasonable belief of further criminal activity, 
justifying the brief inquiry into Defendant's travel plans and the purpose of his 
trip. The vehicle was a rental out of Reno, Nevada, but had California plates. 
See R. 93:36-37,58,69. Bradford observed a package of incense sticks, which he 
testified are often used by drug traffickers to mask the smell of drugs, but 
seldom seen in rental vehicles. R. 93: 6, 37-38, 62 (R.74:|3). Bradford also 
observed in the vehicle a Camelback hydration system, lots of snacks, a large 
blue cooler, and a case of Red Bull energy drinks. R. 93: 37, 62 (R.74:|3). 
Bradford testified that based on his experience and training, these items were 
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consistent with the behavior of drug traffickers who are trying to "get from 
Point A to Point B" within a specific timeframe, without the need of making any 
motel stops. R. 93: 38-39, 62, 65-66. The apparent urgency and suspicious 
nature of Defendant's trip was accentuated by the fact that the Camelback 
hydration system was attached to the driver's seat for ready access by the 
driver. R. 93: 5-6, 37, 62 (R.74:^3). Added to these observations, Trooper 
Bradford knew that drug traffickers will often rent cars, instead of using their 
own, to avoid forfeiture should they be caught. R. 93: 38, 69. 
Undoubtedly, the foregoing facts were susceptible to an innocent 
explanation. However, as mArvizu, "[tjaken together,... they sufficed to form 
a particularized and objective basis" for brief inquiry into Defendant's travels. 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277-78. 
In any event, Trooper Bradford's questions about Defendant's itinerary 
needed no justification independent of the initial stop itself. As recognized by 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, "[tjravel plans typically are related to the 
purpose of a traffic stop because the motorist is traveling at the time of the 
stop." United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215,1221 (10th Cir. 2001); accord United 
States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252,1258 (10th Cir. 2006). The Tenth Circuit 
noted that "a motorist's travel history and travel plans may help explain, or put 
into context, why the motorist was weaving (if tired) or speeding (if there was 
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an urgency to the travel)." Holt, 264 F.3d at 1221. Moreover, such information 
may assist an officer in determining whether to issue a citation or a warning. 
For example, an officer might choose to exercise his or her discretion to issue a 
warning, rather than a citation, upon learning that the driver is rushing to the 
hospital or responding to an emergency.2 
Other courts have likewise recognized that routine questions about a 
driver's travel plans are appropriate in a traffic stop. See United States v. Dunbar, 
553 F.3d 48,56 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that"routine questioning about itinerary, 
'even when not directly related to the violations that induced the stop in the first 
place [,]' does not escalate the stop beyond the scope of an investigative stop") 
(citation omitted); United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that an officer may "'inquir[e] about the occupants' destination, route, 
and purpose'" during a traffic stop) (citation omitted); United States v. Ellis, 497 
F.3d 606, 613-14 & n.l (6th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that an officer "'free to ask 
traffic-related questions about a driver's identity, business and his travel plans 
during the course of a traffic stop'") (citation omitted); United States v. Fishel, 467 
F.3d 855, 857 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that an officer "may also ask about the 
It is widely recognized that officers may choose to issue a warning rather 
than a citation. See, e.g., State v. Mogen, 2002 UT App 235, 52 P.3d 462 (not 
questioning officer's issuance of a warning rather than a citation following a 
legal traffic stop); State v. Gronau, 2001 UT App 245,31 P.3d 601 (same); State v. 
Patefield, 927 P.2d 655 (Utah App. 1996) (same). 
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purpose and itinerary of the driver's trip" during a traffic stop); United States v. 
Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 459 (3rd Cir. 2003) (holding that "questions relating to a 
driver's travel plans ordinarily fall within the scope of a traffic stop"); State v. 
Voichahoske, 709 N.W.2d 659,668 (Neb. 2006) (holding that an officer may ask the 
driver during a traffic stop "about the purpose and destination of his or her 
travel"); People v. Ocasio, 652 N.E.2d 907, 909 (N.Y. 1995) (recognizing that an 
officer may pose questions regarding "identity, address or destination"). 
Even if Trooper Bradford's questioning about Defendant's travel plans 
had not been justified, the minimal delay occasioned by that questioning did not 
render the ensuing detention unlawful. The district court incorrectly assumed 
that any delay caused by questioning outside the scope of the stop rendered the 
detention unlawful, unless supported by reasonable suspicion. See R.78-79:^[3. 
That is not the case. 
The broad language used in some cases might be read to suggest that any 
such delay renders the detention unlawful. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 
115, ]f 11,182 P.3d 935 (holding that questions unrelated to the initial stop are 
permissible "only if they do not add to the delay already lawfully experienced"), 
cert, granted, 199 P.3d 367 (Utah 2008). But as recently explained by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the rule is not that broad: 
An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for 
the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something 
-17-
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other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquires do not 
measurably extend the duration of the stop. 
Johnson, - U.S. - , 129 S.Ct. at 781, 788 (2009) (emphasis added). 
In this case, Trooper Bradford only asked a few travel questions while 
talking to Defendant at the SUV. Those questions, and the answers provided by 
Defendant, could not have extended the stop to any measurable degree. As a 
result, the trooper's travel questions did "not convert the [traffic stop] into 
something other than a lawful seizure." Id. 
3. Because the questioning at the SUV about Defendant's 
travels was reasonable, the follow-up questioning inside the 
patrol car was also reasonable. 
The district court found that Trooper Bradford's follow-up questions in 
the patrol car made the stop "even more 'unlawful'" because they "built upon 
the earlier improper questions and delay." R.80-82:]f^|4, 8. But as explained 
above, the earlier questioning at the SUV did not impermissibly exceed the 
proper scope or duration of the stop. 
Moreover, as correctly recognized by the district court, Defendant's 
answers to Trooper Bradford's questions at the SUV "were clearly suspicious to 
a reasonable person" and "provide[d] reasonable suspicion to justify further 
detention" and questioning. R.79:^|3. In sum, the trooper's subsequent 
questioning of Defendant in the patrol car was a permissible response "to the 
emerging tableau—the circumstances originally warranting the stop, informed 
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by what occurred, and what [Trooper Bradford] learned, as the stop 
progressed/' United States v. Taylor, 511 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2007) (quotations 
and citations omitted). 
Because the stop and resulting detention were lawful, Defendant's 
subsequent consent was not preceded by an illegality. Accordingly, there can be 
no taint and this Court should reverse.3 
B. EVEN ASSUMING A PRIOR ILLEGALITY, DEFENDANTS 
CONSENT, GIVEN AFTER THE STOP ENDED, WAS NOT 
OBTAINED BY POLICE EXPLOITATION OF THAT ILLEGALITY 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the questioning about Defendant's travels 
rendered the detention unlawful, the subsequent consent given by Defendant 
was not obtained by police exploitation of that illegality. 
3
 The district found that the follow-up questions in the patrol car delayed 
the stop. R.76:^|7. That finding was clearly erroneous. The district court found 
that Defendant testified that the questioning in the patrol car " delayed the 
writing of the ticket and obtaining the information from dispatch." R.76:^|7. 
However, Defendant testified that the questioning at the SUV delayed the stop 
five minutes. R. 93: 84. He testified that he was in the patrol car answering 
questions 15 to 20 minutes, but he did not clarify whether the trooper had 
already requested the warrants check or whether the trooper was also 
completing the citation while questioning Defendant. See R. 93: 84. In support 
of its finding, the district court also found that the State "did not present the 
precise sequence concerning [the] questioning and the length of the traffic stop." 
R.76:^[7. It is true that the prosecutor did not elicit this information. However, 
the court itself questioned Trooper Bradford about the sequence and Bradford 
specifically testified that he asked Defendant questions about his travels "while 
[Defendant's] information [was] being run" through dispatch. R. 93: 78-79. 
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The question in exploitation analysis is " whether, granting establishment 
of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has 
been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S 471, 488 (1963) (quotations and citations omitted). In answering that 
question, this Court considers three factors: "(1) 'the purpose and flagrancy' of 
the illegal conduct, (2) 'the presence of intervening circumstances/ and (3) the 
'temporal proximity' between the illegal detention and consent." Hansen, 2002 
UT125, t 64 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,603-04 (1975)). Contrary to 
the district court's conclusion, a consideration of those factors demonstrates that 
the consent search was obtained "by means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. 
Only a few seconds elapsed from the end of the detention to the consent. 
This factor thus weighs against a finding of attenuation. However, "temporal 
proximity alone is not dispositive." State v. Shoulderhlade, 905 P.2d 289,291 (Utah 
1995). And in this case, it is outweighed by the other two factors considered in 
exploitation analysis. 
The purpose of Trooper Bradford's questions was not to obtain consent 
from Defendant, and the questioning in no way contributed to his consent. See 
State v. Pebley, 2005 UT App 312U (observing that "officer's illegal glance into 
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the garage window in no way aided the officers to subsequently gain 
[defendant's] consent, nor was 'the purpose of the illegal conduct to obtain 
consent'") (quoting Hansen, 2002 UT 125, | 64). Indeed, it cannot be said that 
the questioning was "the 'but for' cause" of the consent. State v. Worwood, 2007 
UT 47, | 43,164 P.3d 397. That fact alone dictates that the evidence "not be 
excluded as fruit" of the prolonged seizure. Id. Nor can the questioning be 
considered flagrant.4 As noted, Trooper Bradford had indicia of drug trafficking 
and, in any event, such questioning about travel plans is widely accepted as 
permissible. The questioning was also de minimus, lasting at most only a few 
minutes. 
Moreover, and contrary to the district court's ruling, R.81:f 6, any 
illegality in the questioning was sufficiently purged by intervening 
circumstances, to wit, the termination of the stop. The Ninth Circuit explained 
that "[intervening circumstances that militate in favor of attenuation must be 
sufficiently important to ensure that potentially tainted evidence was 'come at 
by way of some process other than the exploitation of an illegal search." United 
4
 Although the district court concluded that the stop had de-escalated to a 
consensual encounter, it noted that "Bradford himself did not believe himself 
[that] defendant was free to leave but told defendant so because Bradford 
wanted defendant to believe that [he] was free to leave." R.81:^[6. However, the 
law is well-settled that an officer's "subjective view of the nature of the stop is 
not pertinent to [the Court's] analysis when his view was not communicated" to 
the defendant, as here. State v. Tehero, 2006 UT App 419, ^ 10 n.2,147 P.3d 506. 
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States v. Washington, 387 F.3d 1060,1073-74 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Wong Sun, 
371 U.S. at 487-88). Among the examples given by the Ninth Circuit was 
"release from custody." Id. That is what happened here. 
After Trooper Bradford told Defendant to have a nice day and drive 
careful, Defendant exited the patrol car and began walking back to his vehicle. 
R.76:^|8. As correctly concluded by the district court, the detention had at that 
point "de-escalated to a consensual encounter," R.81:^ f5, and Defendant acted in 
a manner consistent with that de-escalation. The de-escalation constituted a 
significant break in any possible causal connection between the questioning and 
the consent. See Worwood, 2007 UT 47, \ 47 (recognizing that an "intervening 
event [may] break the causal chain"). 
Additionally, Trooper Bradford did not ask for permission to search, but 
Defendant himself invited i t - for the second time. See R. 93: 40-41, 72, 79-80 
(R.76:||7-8). This fact is strong evidence that Defendant's consent was "an 
unconstrained, independent decision that was completely unrelated" to any 
improper questioning. Washington, 387 F.3d at 1074 (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
In summary, Defendant's consent to search was "'sufficiently attenuated 
to dissipate [any] taint'" that may have resulted from the questions about 
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Defendant's travel plans. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, | 44 (quoting Segura v. United 
States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984)). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse. 
Respectfully submitted 13 February 2009. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JEFFREY S. GRAY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANK MARRONE, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 0715003329 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: August 22, 2008 
The above matter came before the court for decision on 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
BACKGROUND 
An information was filed on November 14, 2007, charging 
defendant with possession of a controlled substance with intent 
to distribute, possession of drug paraphernalia and speeding, a 
traffic offense. After being bound over after a preliminary 
hearing on April 21, 2008, defendant filed a motion to suppress 
on April 29, 2008. An evidentiary hearing was held June 2, 2008, 
the court took the matter under advisement and allowed the 
parties to file further memoranda. Defendant filed a further 
memorandum June 19, 2008, and the State filed its response July 
21, 2008. Oral argument was scheduled but postponed twice and 
eventually held August 18, 2008. The court took the issues under 
advisement. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Michael Bradford (Bradford) 
was on duty on November 8, 2007, when he observed a vehicle on I-
80 traveling eastbound. The vehicle was speeding and by visual 
estimation Bradford opined the vehicle was traveling over 80 mph 
in the 65 mph zone. That speed was confirmed by radar, Bradford 
clocking defendant at 85 mph. Bradford was stationary at the 
time, and pursued defendant, activated his emergency equipment 
and stopped the vehicle at milepost 148. 
2. Defendant was the driver and sole occupant. He 
immediately stated he was sorry, he knew he was speeding. 
Bradford confirmed that defendant was speeding and Bradford asked 
for license and registration and defendant produced a driver 
license and a registration and a rental agreement. 
3. Bradford observed during the time defendant was obtaining 
the documents that the vehicle had a "lived in" appearance-there 
was a Camelback water device over the driver seat so the driver 
could drink water without pausing, there was a cooler on the rear 
passenger floor within access by the driver, there was a package 
or pack of Red Bull energy drink, there were several food snack 
items about the vehicle, and there was an incense odor in the 
vehicle. 
4. The evidence was not clear on the precise timing and that 
-2-
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failure inures to the benefit of defendant. Sometime while still 
at the vehicle, and the State did not prove that this questioning 
was going on WHILE defendant was looking for his documents, 
Bradford asked where defendant was coming from and where he was 
going. Defendant said he had flown from Florida to California to 
help his mother with the California fires recently occurring 
there and was driving back to Florida. At about that time 
Bradford asked defendant to come back to Bradford's vehicle so he 
could get other information needed to write the ticket. 
5. Defendant agreed and went to Bradford's police vehicle. 
There, and again the timing was not clarified by the State, 
Bradford learned more about the travel plans. That discussion in 
the police vehicle delayed the process of writing the ticket. 
Bradford needed social security information to complete the 
process and that was not available from the driver license. 
6. In the police vehicle defendant stated that, in response 
to questions by Bradford, his mother had driven him to Reno, 
Nevada, where he rented the vehicle he was driving when he was 
stopped by Bradford. He was driving back to Florida but was 
first stopping in Wyoming to hunt. Bradford asked about the hunt 
and defendant did not know where he was going to hunt, what he 
was going to hunt, (what type of game), or how he was going to 
hunt (with firearm, bow and arrow, etc.). Bradford asked if he 
was going through an outfitter and defendant did not know. 
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Bradford asked how he was going to hunt without equipment and 
defendant asked Bradford if outfitters supplied the equipment. 
Defendant also said he was meeting two friends from North 
Carolina to engage in that hunt. 
7. The court finds that this discussion necessarily delayed 
the writing of the ticket and obtaining the information from 
dispatch. While defendant so testified, the State did not dispel 
that testimony and did not present the precise sequence 
concerning questioning and the length of the traffic stop. 
Dispatch also advised Bradford that defendant had past arrests 
for drug trafficking. When defendant heard that dispatch advised 
Bradford of past arrests, defendant volunteered that Bradford 
could search his car or run a dog over it if he wanted. 
8. Bradford gave the ticket to defendant, returned the other 
documents to defendant, and told him to have a nice day and drive 
carefully. Defendant got out of the police vehicle and began to 
return to his car. Bradford then got out immediately and asked 
defendant if he, Bradford, could ask a few more questions. 
Defendant said go ahead. Bradford asked if he was transporting 
any drugs, naming marijuana, cocaine, and others. Defendant said 
he was not, and again said Bradford could to ahead and look in 
the vehicle, and could bring a dog. In fact, Bradford had 
already called another trooper who was in the area on the same 
interdiction assignment who had a drug detection dog in. his 
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vehicle, and that vehicle arrived at an unknown time. 
9. The dog was utilized but no results were revealed by the 
testimony. Bradford observed two spare tires in the rear of the 
Chevrolet Trailblazer defendant had rented. Bradford asked about 
them and defendant said they were going on his camper, though the 
tires were old, did not match, and indeed had a different lug 
bolt configuration. There was also a recent sealant observable 
and so those tires were opened after a sound test. Marijuana was 
found in the two spare tires and the spare tire under the 
vehicle. . , 
DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Here the stop is not challenged and it was justified 
based on the admitted speeding. The actual search is not 
challenged and the only issue is whether there was sufficient 
objective suspicion to justify a detention beyond the traffic 
stop and whether the detention, if unlawful, tainted the consent 
and resulting search. 
2. Under Utah law, as recently reflected in State v. Baker, 
2008 UT App 115, a seizure occurs if in view of all the 
circumstances a reasonable person would have believed he was not 
free to leave. The State bears the burden of proving the 
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reasonableness of the officer's actions during an investigative 
detention. The officer may detain the driver to conduct a limited 
investigation of the circumstances that caused the detention. 
The detention, if it exceeds the reason for the original, traffic 
stop detention, must be temporary and necessary and must be based 
on reasonable suspicion the officer can articulate. The court 
looks to the totality of the circumstances to determine if there 
is an objective basis for suspecting criminal activity and for a 
continued detention. "Investigative acts that are not reasonably 
related to dispelling or resolving the articulated grounds for 
the stop are permissible only if they do not add to the delay 
already lawfully experienced and do not represent any further 
intrusion on the [the detainee's] rights." 
3. Here, obviously, the officer stopped the vehicle for 
traffic violations and in the legitimate course of that 
investigation observed facts that, to the officer, yielded 
suspicion sufficient to justify a further detention. Of course 
the legal question is not whether this officer believed there was 
sufficient basis for the detention, but it is an objective 
question. The observations of Bradford concerning the "lived in" 
appearance, to justify further questions about the travel plans, 
must of themselves amounted to reasonable suspicion to justify 
other questioning if that other questioning delays or extends the 
stop. Questioning defendant about his travel plans at roadside, 
-6-
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before entry into the police vehicle, necessarily delayed the 
traffic stop. That questioning about travel plans would be 
permissible IF it occurred during the gathering of the documents. 
The State did not demonstrate that such questions were asked 
while the documents were being gathered such that the questioning 
did not lengthen the stop beyond the traffic stop. Thus, that 
questioning amounted to impermissible questioning unless there 
was reasonable suspicion that justified such questions. The 
claim of the State must be that the observations about the 
appearance of the vehicle by themselves amounted to reasonable 
suspicion to believe there was criminal activity. The court 
cannot agree that such observations, though somewhat suspicious, 
legally qualified as reasonable suspicion. This trained officer 
no doubt believed the items he saw and their configuration were 
indicative of someone in a hurry to get from Point A to Point B 
and the reason for that hurry was because the delivery of drugs 
were involved. However, alone, those observations do not amount 
to reasonable suspicion that warranted further detention and 
further questions. Once the questioning began, the answers did 
indeed provide reasonable suspicion to justify further detention 
because those answers were clearly suspicious to a reasonable 
person. 
4. After some questions about renting a vehicle to drive to 
Florida after renting it in Reno Bradford had defendant come back 
-7-
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to the police vehicle. The court cannot accept defendant's claim 
that such a request improperly extended the detention. While it 
in fact extended the detention clearly for the time needed to 
walk from defendant's vehicle to the police car, the court is of 
the opinion that such is permissible and reasonable if the 
traffic stop is reasonable. For officer safety, to be out of 
traffic and to more easily hear, an officer may ask a motorist 
detained lawfully for a traffic stop to enter the police vehicle 
to further deal with the traffic issues. However, there again the 
State has failed to show that the further suspicion developed by 
questioning in the police vehicle did not extend the stop. If 
Bradford had been able to have the conversation concerning the 
travel and hunting plans of defendant DURING the computer check 
and during the writing of the ticket, without extending the time 
needed to legitimately run those checks and complete those tasks, 
the questioning would be permissible. Here, the State did not 
show the court that the questions occurred actually during the 
record check process engaged in by Bradford. Thus, again, the 
information unveiled about the rather incredible travel plans and 
hunting plans was not obtained during a legitimate detention. 
The court may not find reasonable suspicion was developed during 
an unlawful detention. This detention was unlawful from the time 
when Bradford began to extend the stop by asking questions at 
roadside, and it became even more "unlawful" during the 
-8-
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conversation inside the vehicle. 
5. Once Bradford returned the documents to defendant he was 
objectively free to leave because a reasonable person would 
believe, based on the totality of the circumstances, that he was 
free to end the encounter and depart. State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 
659, 661 (UT 2002). The detention had de-escalated to a 
consensual encounter. While the court concludes the consent was 
voluntary, the consent was not effective. 
6. If there is a prior illegality that taints the consent 
the consent is not effective. Here, the unlawful detention had 
just finished when Bradford returned the documents and told 
defendant he was free to leave. There were no intervening 
circumstances. Bradford told defendant he was free to leave but 
Bradford did not believe himself defendant was free to leave but 
told defendant so because Bradford wanted defendant to believe 
that defendant was free to leave. At that time, Bradford, based 
on the rather incredible stories, did have reasonable suspicion 
but again it had been developed during an unlawful detention. 
The purposes of the exclusionary rule are chiefly to deter police 
conduct that is improper in the view of prevailing law. 
7. However, the "voluntary" consent given by defendant was 
obtained as a direct result of the conduct of Bradford in 
obtaining information improperly. 
8. In summary, the factors observed by Bradford concerning 
-9-
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the state of the car and its "lived in" look did not by 
themselves justify other questioning abour matters apart from the 
traffic stop when such questioning extended the length of the 
stop. That is because objectively those factors, while 
suspicious, do not under Utah law amount to reasonable suspicion 
that justified the asking of those further questions about travel 
plans if those questions further detain the suspect. Other 
factors may give such reasonable suspicion, but not these factors 
observed by Bradford alone. Thus, from that point on any further 
questions beyond the traffic stop questions were also improper as 
they delayed the stop and extended the time of the stop, and the 
later questions built upon the earlier improper questions and 
delay. 
9. The State argues that the questions could be asked as 
they were designed to confirm or dispel the suspicion of 
Bradford. The court believes that is the wrong standard. The 
questioning itself is the delay and that delay must be justified 
by objective factors amounting to reasonable suspicion. The only 
factors present here before the questioning were the observations 
about the interior of the vehicle. Those were, as stated, 
somewhat suspicious but insufficient to justify further 
questioning that extended the stop. The questioning, again, was 
not per se unlawful but it was unlawful because of its timing and 
consequent delay. 
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9. Because the detention was unlawful, even though the 
consent was given "voluntarily," the consent was not legally 
voluntary because it came about based on the taint of the illegal 
detention and there were no factors that dissipated that taint. 
The consent was thus not legally voluntary. 
The motion to suppress is GRANTED. 
The case is set for a status conference September 15, 2008, 
at 8:30 a.m. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
DATED this " w day of 
j//i) /. 2008 
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